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Abstract
In this paper we examine implications of model uncertainty due to robustness (RB) for con-
sumption and saving and the market price of uncertainty under limited information-processing
capacity (rational inattention or RI). We first solve the robust permanent income models with
inattentive consumers and show that RI by itself creates an additional demand for robustness
that leads to higher “induced uncertainty” facing consumers. Second, we explore how the in-
duced uncertainty composed of (i) model uncertainty due to RB and (ii) state uncertainty due
to RI, affects consumption-saving decisions and the market price of uncertainty. We find that
induced uncertainty can better explain the observed market price of uncertainty – low atten-
tion increases the effect of model misspecification. We also show the observational equivalence
between RB and risk-sensitivity (RS) in environment.
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1 Introduction
Hansen and Sargent (1995) first introduced robustness (RB, a concern for model misspecification)
into linear-quadratic (LQ) economic models.1 In robust control problems, agents do not know the
true data-generating process and are concerned about the possibility that their model (denoted
the approximating model) is misspecified; consequently, they choose optimal decisions as if the
subjective distribution over shocks was chosen by an evil nature in order to minimize their expected
utility.2 Robustness (RB) models produce precautionary savings but remain within the class
of LQ models, which leads to analytical simplicity. A second class of models that produces
precautionary savings but remains within the class of LQ models is the risk-sensitive (RS) model
of Hansen and Sargent (1995) and Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999). In the RS model agents
effectively compute expectations through a distorted lens, increasing their effective risk aversion by
overweighting negative outcomes. The resulting decision rules depend explicitly on the variance of
the shocks, producing precautionary savings, but the value functions are still quadratic functions
of the states. As shown in Hansen and Sargent (2007), the risk-sensitivity preference can be used
to interpret the desire for robustness as they lead to the same consumption-saving decisions, and
similar asset pricing implications.3
Sims (2003) first introduce rational inattention into economics and argued that it is a plau-
sible method for introducing sluggishness, randomness, and delay into economic models. In his
formulation agents have finite Shannon channel capacity, limiting their ability to process signals
about the true state of the world. As a result, an impulse to the economy induces only gradual
responses by individuals, as their limited capacity requires many periods to discover just how
much the state has moved. Since RI introduces additional uncertainty, the endogenous noise due
to finite capacity, into economic models, RI by itself creates an additional demand for robustness.
In addition, agents with finite capacity need to use a filter to update their perceived state upon
receiving noisy signals, which may lead to another demand for robustness, the robust Kalman
1See Hansen and Sargent (2007) for a textbook treatment on robustness and Hansen and Sargent (2010) for
a recent survey. For decision-theoretic foundations of the robustness preference, see Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini (2006) and Strzalecki (2011) for detailed discussions.
2The solution to a robust decision-maker’s problem is the equilibrium of a max-min game between the decision-
maker and nature.
3It is worth noting that although both RB (or RS) and CARA preferences (i.e., Caballero 1990 and Wang
2003) increase the precautionary savings premium via the intercept terms in the consumption functions, they have
distinct implications for the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income (MPC). Specifically, CARA
preferences do not alter the MPC relative to the LQ case, whereas RB or RS increases the MPC. That is, under
RB, in response to a negative wealth shock, the consumer would choose to reduce consumption more than that
predicted in the CARA model (i.e., save more to protect themselves against the negative shock).
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filter.4
In this paper we first construct a discrete-time robust permanent income model with inatten-
tive consumers who have concerns about two types of model misspecification: (i) the disturbances
to the perceived permanent income (the disturbances here include both the fundamental shock
and the RI-induced noise shock) and (ii) the Kalman gain.5 For ease of presentation, we will
refer to the first type of model misspecification as Type I and the second as Type II.6 After
solving the model explicitly, we first examine how the preference of robustness affects optimal
consumption and precautionary savings via interacting with finite capacity. Specifically, we show
that given finite capacity, concerns about the two types of model misspecification have opposing
impacts on the marginal propensity to consume out of perceived permanent income (MPC) and
precautionary savings. In the case with only Type I model misspecification, since agents with low
capacity are very concerned about the confluence of low permanent income and high consumption
(meaning they believe their permanent income is high so they consume a lot and then their new
signal indicates that in fact their permanent income was low), they take actions which reduce
the probability of this bad event – they save more.7 As for Type II misspecification, an increase
in the strength of the preference for robustness increases the Kalman gain, which leads to lower
total uncertainty about the true level of permanent income and then lower precautionary savings.
In addition, the strength of the precautionary effect is positively related to the amount of this
uncertainty that always increases as finite capacity gets smaller. Using the explicit expression
for consumption dynamics, we also show that increasing RB increases the robust Kalman filter
gain and thus leads to less relative volatility of consumption to income (smoother consumption
process) when we only consider Type II misspecification. In contrast, RB increases the relative
volatility of consumption by increasing the MPC out of changes in permanent income when we
only consider Type I misspecification.8
4The key assumption in Luo and Young (2010) is that agents with finite capacity distrust their budget constraint,
but still use an ordinary Kalman filter to estimate the true state; in this case, a distortion to the mean of permanent
income is introduced to represent possible model misspecification. However, this case ignores the effect of the RI-
induced noise on the demand for robustness.
5Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) provide a general framework to study and quantify robustness in
continuous-time. See Cagetti et al. (2002) and Maenhout (2004) for the applications of robustness in pricing,
growth, and portfolio choice in continuous-time.
6When modeling Type II misspecification, we assume that the agent faces the commitment on the part of the
minimizing agent to previous distortions.
7Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) apply Type I RB in the SOE-RBC model proposed in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)
and show that this type of RB can help generate realistic relative volatility of consumption to income and the
current account dynamics observed in emerging and developed small-open economies.
8This mechanism is similar to that examined in Luo and Young (2010).
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Furthermore, we compare the implications of RS and RB for consumption and savings when
considering both control and filtering decisions of inattentive consumers. In the risk-sensitive
permanent income model with imperfect-state-observation due to RI, the classical Kalman filter
that extremizes the expected value of a certain quadratic objective function is still optimal. After
solving the RB and RS models with filtering, we establish the observational equivalence (OE)
conditions between RB and RS. We find that the simple and linear OE between RB and RS
established in Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Luo and Young (2010) no longer holds, we instead
have a complicated and nonlinear OE between RB and RS under RI.
We next investigate the asset pricing implications of RB and RI within the PIH setting.9 Fol-
lowing Hansen (1987) and Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), we interpret the consumption-
saving decisions in terms of a social planning problem and these decisions are equilibrium alloca-
tions for a competitive equilibrium. We can then deduce asset prices as in the consumption-based
asset pricing literature by finding the shadow prices that clear security markets. Since these
asset prices include information about the agent’s intertemporal preferences, they measure the
risk and uncertainty aversion of the agent. Given the explicit solutions for consumption and
saving decisions, we can explicitly solve for the market prices of induced uncertainty under RB
and RI.10 We find that induced uncertainty due to RB and RI significantly increases the market
price of risk. The mechanism is straightforward to describe. Under RB, the market price of
uncertainty is related to the norm of the worst-case shock (that is, the size of the pessimistic
distortion to the underlying stochastic process for income); adding rational inattention increases
the size of these distortions and therefore amplifies the effect on asset prices. We find that our
model, under plausible calibrations of the fear of model misspecification based on detection error
probabilities (as in Hansen and Sargent 2007), produces stochastic discount factors that satisfy
the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the robustness versions
of the RI permanent income model with filtering, and examines how the preference for robustness
affects individual consumption and saving decisions. Section 3 explores how these two infor-
mational frictions affect individual consumption and saving dynamics. Section 4 compares the
risk-sensitive and robust filtering problem under RI. Section 5 computes how induced uncertainty
due to RB and RI affects the market prices of risk. Section 6 concludes.
9See Epstein and Wang (1994), Chen and Epstein (2002), and Ju and Miao (2012) for ambiguity, risk aversion,
and asset returns.
10To explore how induced uncertainty due to RB and RI affects market prices of uncertainty, we follow the
procedure adopted in Epstein and Wang (1994) and Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999).
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2 Robust Control and Filtering under Rational Inattention
2.1 A Rational Inattention Version of the Standard Permanent Income Model
In this section we consider a rational inattention (RI) version of the standard permanent in-
come model. In the standard permanent income model (Hall 1978, Sargent 1978, Flavin 1981),
households solve the dynamic consumption-savings problem
v(s0) = max{ct}
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
]
subject to
st+1 = Rst − ct + ζt+1, (1)
where u(ct) = −12 (c− ct)2 is the period utility function, c > 0 is the bliss point, ct is consumption,
st = bt +
1
R
∞∑
j=0
R−jEt [yt+j ] (2)
is permanent income, i.e., the expected present value of lifetime resources, consisting of financial
wealth (bt) plus human wealth (i.e., the discounted expected present value of current and future
labor income: 1R
∑∞
j=0R
−jEt [yt+j ]),
ζt+1 ≡ 1
R
∞∑
j=t+1
(
1
R
)j−(t+1)
(Et+1 − Et) [yj ] , (3)
is the time (t+ 1) innovation to permanent income, bt is financial wealth (or cash-on-hand), yt
is a labor income process with Gaussian white noise innovations, β is the discount factor, and
R > 1 is the constant gross interest rate at which the consumer can borrow and lend freely.11
In this paper, we assume that income yt takes the following AR(1) process with the persistence
coefficient ρ ∈ [0, 1],
yt+1 = ρyt + xt + εt+1, (4)
where xt ≡ (g − ρ) gty0 is the growth component, g is the constant gross growth rate of income,
y0 is defined as the initial level of income, and εt+1 is iid with mean 0 and variance ω
2.12 Given
this income specification, we have st ≡ bt+ 1R−ρyt+ 1(R−g)(R−ρ)xt and ζt+1 = εt+1/ (R− ρ), where
and ω2ζ ≡ var (ζt+1) = ω2/ (R− ρ)2.13 Finally, financial wealth (b) follows the process
bt+1 = Rbt + yt − ct. (5)
11We only require that yt and R are such that permanent income is finite.
12Note that when g = 1, this specification reduces to yt+1 = ρyt + (1− ρ) y0 + εt+1, one of the most popular
income specifications in the consumption literature.
13For the rest of the paper we will restrict attention to points where ct < c, so that utility is increasing and
concave.
4
This specification follows that in Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981) and implies that optimal con-
sumption is determined by permanent income:
ct =
(
R− 1
βR
)
st − 1
R− 1
(
1− 1
βR
)
c. (6)
We assume for the remainder of this section that βR = 1, since this setting is the only one
that implies zero drift in consumption under rational expectations. Under this assumption the
model leads to the well-known random walk result of Hall (1978):
∆ct+1 = (R− 1) ζt+1; (7)
the change in consumption depends neither on the past history of labor income nor on anticipated
changes in labor income. We also point out the well-known result that the standard PIH model
with quadratic utility implies the certainty equivalence property holds: uncertainty has no effect
on consumption, so that there is no precautionary saving.
To motivate what follows, we now remind readers why (7) is inadequate as an empirical
representation of consumption. There are many routes we could take here; we choose to follow
Campbell and Deaton (1989) and run a simple bivariate VAR of (demeaned) labor income growth
and the (demeaned) saving rate out of labor income, obtaining[
∆ log (yt)− µy
st
yt
− µs
]
=
[
0.0357 0.02
−0.072 0.9947
][
∆ log (yt−1)− µy
st−1
yt−1 − µs
]
+
[
u1,t
u2,t
]
.
The data we use is quarterly NIPA data on total compensation of employees and gross saving
deflated using the PCE deflator (defined as labor income minus consumption of nondurables and
services), from 1947Q1-2014Q1. Campbell and Deaton (1989) show that the PIH implies the
autocorrelation matrix should take the form[
δ 0
δ τ−1
]
(8)
where δ is a unrestricted coefficient and τ 6= 0 is the effective discount rate for future cash
flows (the growth-adjusted interest rate); this matrix embodies both a test of “excess sensitivity”
(that consumption responds to predictable changes in income) and a test of “excess smoothness”
(consumption growth does not vary enough with income growth).14 Our estimated matrix does
not satisfy the restrictions embodied in (8) – we can reject the equality of the elements in the
first column and our estimate of τ is economically nonsensical (including durables makes these
14In fact, Campbell and Deaton (1989) show that the two excesses are the same – if consumption responds
excessively to anticipated income changes it necessarily must respond insufficiently to unanticipated ones.
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rejections more pronounced). One method for attacking these rejections is to assume that the
information set of the agents differs systematically from that of the econometrician. It is common
to assume that agents have more information than the econometrician about their individual
situation; rational inattention implies that, for some variables, agents may actually have less
information.
To this end we follow Sims (2003, 2010) and incorporate rational inattention (RI) due to finite
information-processing capacity into the model. Under RI, consumers have only finite Shannon
channel capacity to observe the state of the world. Specifically, we use the concept of entropy
from information theory to characterize the uncertainty about a random variable; the reduction
in entropy is thus a natural measure of information flow.15 With finite capacity κ ∈ (0,∞) ,
a variable s following a continuous distribution cannot be observed without error and thus the
information set at time t + 1, It+1, is generated by the entire history of noisy signals
{
s∗j
}t+1
j=0
.
Following the literature, we assume the noisy signal takes the additive form s∗t+1 = st+1 + ξt+1,
where ξt+1 is the endogenous noise caused by finite capacity. We further assume that ξt+1 is an
iid idiosyncratic shock and is independent of the fundamental shock. Agents with finite capacity
will choose a new signal s∗t+1 ∈ It+1 =
{
s∗1, s∗2, · · ·, s∗t+1
}
that reduces their uncertainty about the
state variable st+1 as much as possible. Formally, this idea can be described by the information
constraint
H (st+1|It)−H (st+1|It+1)≤ κ, (9)
where κ is the consumer’s information channel capacity, H (st+1| It) denotes the entropy of the
state prior to observing the new signal at t+ 1, and H (st+1| It+1) is the entropy after observing
the new signal. κ imposes an upper bound on the amount of information – that is, the change in
the entropy – that can be transmitted in any given period. Finally, following the literature, we
suppose that the prior distribution of st+1 is Gaussian.
Under the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) setting, as has been shown in Sims (2003, 2010),
the true state under RI also follows a normal distribution st|It ∼ N (E [st|It] ,Σt), where Σt =
Et
[
(st − ŝt)2
]
.16 In addition, given that the noisy signal takes the additive form s∗t+1 = st+1+ξt+1
and the noise ξt+1 is an iid Gaussian variable, the posterior variance of st+1 is also Gaussian within
15Formally, entropy is defined as the expectation of the negative of the (natural) log of the density function,
−E [ln (f (s))]. For example, the entropy of a discrete distribution with equal weight on two points is simply
E [ln2 (f (s))] = −0.5 ln (0.5)− 0.5 ln (0.5) = 0.69, and the unit of information contained in this distribution is 0.69
“nats”. In this case, an agent can remove all uncertainty about s if the capacity devoted to monitoring s is κ = 0.69
nats.
16Shafieepoorfard and Raginsky (2013) derive the result formally, as opposed to the heuristic approach from Sims
(2003).
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the LQG structure.17 The information-processing constraint, (9), can then be reduced to
ln
(
R2Σt + ω
2
ζ
)− ln (Σt+1) ≤ 2κ; (10)
Since this constraint is always binding, we can compute the value of the steady state conditional
variance Σ: Σ = ω2ζ/
(
exp (2κ)−R2). Given this Σ, we can use the usual formula for updating
the conditional variance of a Gaussian distribution Σ to recover the variance of the endogenous
noise (Λ):
Λ =
(
Σ−1 −Ψ−1)−1 , (11)
where Ψ = R2Σ+ω2ζ is the posterior variance of the state. Finally, ŝt is governed by the following
Kalman filtering equation:
ŝt+1 = (1− θ) (Rŝt − ct) + θ (st+1 + ξt+1) , (12)
given s0 ∼ N (ŝ0,Σ), where θ = ΣΛ−1 = 1− exp (−2κ) is the Kalman gain.18
Note that after substituting (1) into (12), we have an alternative expression of the regular
Kalman filter:
ŝt+1 = Rŝt − ct + ηt+1, (13)
where
ηt+1 = θR (st − ŝt) + θ (ζt+1 + ξt+1) (14)
is the innovation to the mean of the distribution of perceived permanent income,
st − ŝt = (1− θ) ζt
1− (1− θ)R · L −
θξt
1− (1− θ)R · L, (15)
and Et [ηt+1] = 0 because the expectation is conditional on the perceived signals and inattentive
agents cannot perceive the lagged shocks perfectly.19 The variance of the innovation to the
perceived state is:
ω2η = var (ηt+1) =
θ
1− (1− θ)R2ω
2
ζ , (16)
17This result is often assumed as a matter of convenience in signal extraction models with exogenous noises, and
RI can rationalize this assumption.
18As argued in Sims (2010), instead of using fixed finite channel capacity to model limited information-processing
ability, one could assume that the marginal cost of information processing (i.e., the shadow price of information-
processing ability) is constant. That is, the Lagrange multiplier on (10) is constant. Luo and Young (2014) show
that in the univariate case these two RI modeling strategies are observationally equivalent in the sense that they
lead to the same conditional variance. Under the observational equivalence, we can construct a mapping between
fixed information-processing cost and fixed channel capacity.
19In order that the variance of η be finite we need κ > ln (R) ≈ R− 1. For short time periods this requirement
is obviously not very restrictive. Since R > 1, some minimum level of capacity is needed to control the conditional
mean of permanent income.
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which means that ω2η reflects two sources of uncertainty facing the consumer: (i) fundamental
uncertainty, ω2ζ and (ii) induced uncertainty, i.e., state uncertainty due to RI,
[
θ
1−(1−θ)R2 − 1
]
ω2ζ .
Therefore, as κ decreases, the relative importance of induced uncertainty to fundamental uncer-
tainty increases.
In the next section, we will discuss alternative ways to robustify this RI-PIH model and their
different implications for consumption, precautionary savings, and the welfare costs of uncertainty.
The RB-RI model proposed here encompasses the hidden state (HS) model discussed in Hansen,
Sargent, and Wang (2002, henceforth, HSW) and Hansen and Sargent (2005); the main difference
is that agents in the RB-RI model cannot observe the entire state vector perfectly, whereas agents
in the RB-hidden state model can observe some part of the state vector (in particular, the part
they control).
2.2 Concerns about the Fundamental Shock and the Noise Shock
As shown in Hansen and Sargent (2007), we can robustify the permanent income model by
assuming agents with finite capacity distrust their model of the data-generating process (i.e.,
their income process), but still use an ordinary Kalman filter to estimate the true state. Note
that without the concern for model misspecification, the consumer has no doubts about the
probability model used to form the conditional expectation of permanent income (s). It is clear
that the Kalman filter under RI, (13), is not only affected by the fundamental shock (ζt+1), but
also affected by the endogenous noise (ξt+1) induced by finite capacity; these noise shocks could
be another source of the demand for robustness. We therefore need to consider this demand for
robustness in the RB-RI model. By adding the additional concern for robustness developed here,
we are able to strengthen the effects of robustness on decisions.20 Specifically, we assume that
the agent thinks that (13) is the approximating model.
A simple version of robust optimal control considers the question of how to make decisions
when the agent does not know the probability model that generates the data. Specifically, an agent
with a preference for robustness considers a range of models surrounding the given approximating
model, (13):
ŝt+1 = Rŝt − ct + ωηwt + ηt+1. (17)
where wt distorts the mean of the innovation, and makes decisions that maximize lifetime expected
utility given this worst possible model (i.e., the distorted model).21 To make that model (13) is a
20Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) use this approach to study the joint dynamics of consumption, income, and the
current account in emerging and developed countries.
21Formally, this setup is a game between the decision-maker and a malevolent nature that chooses the distortion
process wt.
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good approximation when (17) generates the data, we constrain the approximation errors by an
upper bound ψ0:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt+1w2t
]
≤ ψ0, (18)
where E0 [·] denotes conditional expectations evaluated with model, and the left side of this
inequality is a statistical measure of the discrepancy between the distorted and approximating
models. Note that the standard full-information RE case corresponds to ψ0 = 0. In the general
case in which ψ0 > 0, the evil agent is given an intertemporal entropy budget ψ0 > 0 which
defines the set of models that the agent is considering. Following Hansen and Sargent (2007), we
compute robust decision rules by solving the following two-player zero-sum game: a minimizing
decision maker chooses the optimal consumption process {ct} and a maximizing evil agent chooses
the model distortion process {wt}.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2007a), a simple robustness version of the PIH model proposed
above can be written as
v (ŝt) = max
ct
min
wt
{
−1
2
(c− ct)2 + β
(
1
2
ϑw2t + Et [v (ŝt+1)]
)}
(19)
subject to the distorted transition equation (i.e., the worst-case model), (17), where ϑ > 0 is the
Lagrange multiplier on the constraint specified in (18) and controls how bad the error can be.
(19) is a standard dynamic programming problem and can be easily solved using the standard
procedure.22 The following proposition summarizes the solution to the RB-RI model.
Proposition 1 Given ϑ and κ, the consumption function under RB and RI is
ct =
R− 1
1−Π ŝt −
Πc
1−Π (20)
with Π < 1, the mean of the worst-case shock is
ωηwt =
(R− 1)Π
1−Π ŝt −
Πc¯
1−Π , (21)
and ŝt is governed by
ŝt+1 = ρsŝt +
Πc
1−Π + ηt+1 (22)
under the approximation model, where ρs =
1−RΠ
1−Π ∈ (0, 1),
Π =
Rω2η
ϑ
∈ (0, 1) , (23)
ηt+1 and ω
2
η are defined in (14) and (14), and θ = 1− 1/ exp(2κ).
22There is a one-to-one correspondence between ψ0 in (18) and ϑ in (19).
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Proof. See Appendix 7.1. Π < 1 can be obtained because the second-order condition for the
optimization problem is
R (R− 1)
2
(
1−Rω2η/ϑ
) > 0, i.e., Π < 1.
It is worth noting that (20) can also be obtained using multiplier preferences to represent a
fear of model misspecification:
v̂ (ŝt) = max
ct
{
−1
2
(ct − c)2 + β min
mt+1
Et [mt+1v̂ (ŝt+1) + ϑmt+1 ln (mt+1)]
}
, (24)
where mt+1 is the likelihood ratio, Et [mt+1 ln (mt+1)] is defined as the relative entropy of the
distribution of the distorted model with respect to that of the approximating model, and ϑ > 0
is the shadow price of capacity that can reduce the distance between the two distributions, i.e.,
the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint:
Et [mt+1 ln (mt+1)] ≤ η,
where η ≥ 0 defines an entropy ball of the distribution of the distorted model with respect to
that of the approximating model. Following the same procedure adopted in Hansen and Sargent
(2007), we can also obtain the corresponding value function:
v̂ (ŝt) = Ω
(
ŝt − c
R− 1
)2
+ Ω0, (25)
where Ω = −R(R−1)2(1−Π) and Ω0 = ϑ2(R−1) ln
(
1− (R−1)Π1−Π
)
. Although the two-player minmax game
and multiplier preferences lead to the same consumption-saving decisions, they have different
asset pricing implications. (See Section 5 for a detailed discussion.)
Equations (20) and (23) determine the effects of model uncertainty due to RB and state un-
certainty due to RI on the marginal propensity to consume out of perceived permanent income
(MPCη ≡ R−11−Π) and the constant precautionary saving premium (PS ≡ Πc1−Π). These two ex-
pressions show that Π governs how RB and RI interact and then affect the consumption function
and precautionary savings. Since Π is increasing with the degrees of both RB (smaller ϑ) and
RI (smaller κ and θ), it is straightforward to show that either RB or RI leads to more constant
precautionary savings and higher marginal propensity to consume, holding other factors constant
and given that Π < 1:
∂ (MPCη)
∂ϑ
< 0 and
∂ (PS)
∂ϑ
< 0.
We now present the intuition about the effects of robustness (ϑ) on precautionary savings. Since
agents with low capacity are very concerned about the confluence of low permanent income and
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high consumption (meaning they believe their permanent income is high so they consume a lot
and then their new signal indicates that in fact their permanent income was low), they take
actions which reduce the probability of this bad event – they save more. The strength of the
precautionary effect is positively related to the amount of uncertainty regarding the true level of
permanent income, and this uncertainty increases as θ gets smaller.
However, RB and RI affect consumption and precautionary savings through distinct channels.
RI affects Π by increasing the variance of the innovation to the perceived state, ω2η, whereas RB af-
fects Π via changing the structure of the response of consumption to income shocks. Furthermore,
if we consider the marginal propensity to consume out of true permanent income,
MPCζ ≡ R− 1
1−Rθ/ [ϑ (1− (1− θ)R2)]ω2ζ
θ, (26)
we can immediately see that
∂ (MPCζ)
∂ϑ
< 0,
∂ (MPCζ)
∂θ
> 0.
That is, both an increase in the demand for robustness and an increase in inattention increases
the marginal propensity to consume out of true (but unobserved) permanent income.
To examine the relative importance of the two informational frictions in determining the
consumption function and precautionary savings, we compare the effects from proportionate shifts
in ϑ governing RB and κ governing RI. Specifically, the marginal effects on Π from an increase in
ϑ and κ are given by
∂Π
∂κ
=
R
(
1−R2) exp (−2κ)
ϑ [1− exp (−2κ)R2]2 ω
2
ζ ,
∂Π
∂ϑ
= −Rω
2
η
ϑ2
,
respectively. Therefore, the marginal rate of transformation between proportionate changes in ϑ
and changes in κ can be written as
MRT = − ∂Π/∂κ
(∂Π/∂ϑ)ϑ
=
2
(
R2 − 1) exp (−2κ)
(1− exp (−2κ)) (1− exp (−2κ)R2) > 0. (27)
This expression gives the proportionate reduction in ϑ (i.e., a stronger preference for RB) that
compensates, at the margin, for a decrease in κ (i.e., more inattentive) — in the sense of preserv-
ing the same effect on the consumption function for a given ŝt. Equation (27) shows that this
compensating change depends on the interest rate (R) and the degree of inattention (κ). Figure 1
clearly shows that MRT is decreasing with κ for any given R. Since ∂ (MRT) /∂κ < 0, consumers
with lower capacity will ask for higher compensation in an proportionate increase in model uncer-
tainty facing them for an increase in capacity. For example, when R = 1.03, MRT = 0.256 when
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κ = 0.5 bits, while MRT = 0.054 when κ = 1 bit. In other words, to maintain the same effect
on the consumption function, a decrease in κ by 50 percent (from 1 bit to 0.5 bits) matches up
approximately with a proportional decline in ϑ of 2.7 percent. We will show later that there is
a model-independent procedure for estimating ϑ; the tradeoff here could in principle be used to
discipline the choice for κ.23
It is also instructive to examine exactly what agents “fear” – that is, what are the dynamics
of permanent income under the worst-case model? Substituting (20) and (21) into (17) yields the
law of motion for ŝt under the worst-case model:
ŝt+1 = ŝt + ηt+1 = (1− θR) ŝt + θRst + θ (ζt+1 + ξt+1)
as compared to the actual process
ŝt+1 =
(
1−R2ω2η/ϑ
1−Rω2η/ϑ
− θR
)
ŝt +
(
Rω2η/ϑ
)
c
1−Rω2η/ϑ
+ θRst + θ (ζt+1 + ξt+1) . (28)
The key difference between the two processes is the autocorrelation parameter; since
1−R2ω2η/ϑ
1−Rω2η/ϑ < 1,
the worst case model is more persistent than the true process. As noted in Kasa (2006), the most
destructive distortions are low-frequency ones, so naturally the agents in the model design their
decision rules to be robust against precisely those kinds of processes. ϑ does not appear in (??),
as it only determines the size of the distortion process {wt} needed to achieve the worst-case
model.24
2.3 Robust Kalman Filter Gain
Another source of robustness could arise from the Kalman filter gain. In Section 2.2, we assumed
that the agent distrusts the innovation to the perceived state but trusts the regular Kalman filter
gain. Following Hansen and Sargent (2005) and Hansen and Sargent (Chapter 17, 2007), in this
section we consider a situation in which the agent pursues a robust Kalman gain and faces the
commitment on the part of the minimizing agent to previous distortions. Specifically, assume
that at t the agent observes the noisy signal
s∗t = st + ξt, (29)
23κ (or θ) are difficult to estimate outside the model; the literature on processing information provides estimates
of the total ability of humans, but little guidance on how much of that ability would be dedicated to monitoring
economic data. Obviously it would not be feasible to model all the competing demands for attention.
24If θ = 1 (so that ŝt = st) then the worst-case model is a random walk.
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where st is the true state and ξt is the iid endogenous noise. The variance of the noise term,
Λ = var (ξt), is determined by:
Λ =
(
ω2ζ +R
2Σ
)
Σ
ω2ζ + (R
2 − 1) Σ ,
and Σ = ω2ζ/
(
exp (2κ)−R2) is the steady state conditional variance. Given the budget constraint,
st+1 = Rst − ct + ζt+1, (30)
we consider the following time-invariant robust Kalman filter equation,
ŝt+1 = (1− θ) (Rŝt − ct) + θ (st+1 + ξt+1) , (31)
where ŝt+1 is the estimate of the state using the history of the noisy signals,
{
s∗j
}t+1
j=0
. We want
θ to be robust to unstructured misspecifications of Equations (29) and (30). To obtain a robust
Kalman filter gain, the agent considers the following distorted model:
st+1 = Rst − ct + ζt+1 + ων1,t+1, (32)
s∗t+1 = st+1 + ξt+1 + %ν2,t+1, (33)
where ω = ωζ , % =
√
Λ, and ν1,t+1 and ν2,t+1 are distortions to the conditional means of the two
shocks, ζt+1 and ξt+1, respectively.
Combining (30), (31), (32) with (33) gives the following dynamic equation for the estimation
error:
et+1 = (1− θ)Ret + (1− θ) ζt+1 − θξt+1 + (1− θ)ων1,t+1 − θ%ν2,t+1, (34)
where et = st − ŝt.25 We can then solve for the robust Kalman filter gain corresponding to this
problem by solving the following deterministic optimal linear regulator problem:
eT0 Pe0 = max{νt+1}
∞∑
t=0
(
eTt et − ϑνTt+1νt+1
)
, (35)
subject to
et+1 = (1− θ)Ret +Dνt+1, (36)
where D =
[
(1− θ)ω −θ%
]
and νt+1 =
[
ν1,t+1 ν2,t+1
]T
. We can compute the worst-case
shock by solving the corresponding Bellman equation and obtain
ν∗t+1 = Qet, (37)
25Note that control variable, c, does not affect the estimation error equation.
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where
Q =
(
ϑI −DTPD)−1DTP (1− θ)R. (38)
Here I is the identity matrix, P is the value function matrix, and Q depends on robustness (ϑ)
and channel capacity (κ).
For arbitrary Kalman filter gain θ and (37), the error in reconstructing the state s can be
written as
et+1 = {(1− θ)R+ [(1− θ)ω − θ%]Q} et + (1− θ) ζt+1 − θξt+1. (39)
Taking unconditional mean on both sides of (39) gives
Σt+1 = {(1− θ)R+ [(1− θ)ω − θ%]Q}Σt + (1− θ)2 ω2ζ + θ2ω2ξ , (40)
where Σt+1 = E
[
e2t+1
]
. From (40), it follows directly that in the steady state
Σ (θ;Q) =
(1− θ)2 ω2ζ + θ2ω2ξ
1− χ2 ,
where χ = (1− θ)R+ [(1− θ)ω − θ%]Q, and the robust Kalman filter gain θ (ϑ, κ) minimizes the
variance of et, Σ (θ;Q):
θ (ϑ, κ) = arg min (Σ (θ;Q (ϑ, κ))) . (41)
Figure 2 illustrates how robustness (measured by ϑ) and inattention (measured by κ) affect the
robust Kalman gain when R = 1.02 and ωζ = 1.
26 It clearly shows that holding the degree of
attention (i.e., channel capacity κ) fixed, increasing robustness (reducing ϑ) increases the Kalman
gain (θ). In addition, for given robustness (ϑ), the Kalman gain is increasing with capacity. For
example, when log (ϑ) = 3, the robust Kalman gain will increase from 60.17 percent to 77.35
percent when capacity κ increases from 0.6 bits to 1 bit; when κ = 0.6 bits, the robust Kalman
gain will increase from 58.31 percent to 60.17 percent if ϑ falls from log (ϑ) = 4 to 3.27
After obtaining the robust Kalman gain θ (ϑ, κ), we can solve the Bellman equation proposed
in Section 2.2 using the Kalman filtering equation with robust θ. The following proposition
summarizes the solution to this problem:
Proposition 2 Given ϑ and κ, the consumption function is
ct =
R− 1
1−Π ŝt −
Πc
1−Π , (42)
26We use the program rfilter.m provided in Hansen and Sargent (2007) to compute the robust Kalman filter
gain θ (ϑ, κ).
27This result is consistent with that obtained in a continuous-time filtering problem discussed in Kasa (2006).
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where Π =
Rω2η
ϑ ∈ (0, 1),
ω2η = var (ηt+1) =
θ (ϑ, κ)
1− (1− θ (ϑ, κ))R2ω
2
ζ , (43)
and ŝt is governed by
ŝt+1 = ρsŝt + ηt+1, (44)
where ρs =
1−RΠ
1−Π ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The proof is the similar to that provided in Appendix 7.1. Here we just need to replace
θ (κ) = 1− exp (−2κ) with θ (ϑ, κ).
Note that here θ is a function of both ϑ (concerns about Kalman gain) and κ (channel capacity),
rather than simply 1 − 1/ exp (2κ) as obtained in Section 2.2. In this case the agent is not only
concerned about disturbances to the perceived permanent income, but also concerned about the
Kalman gain. It is clear from (42) and (43) that the preference for robustness has opposing effects
on both the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income, i.e., the responsiveness
of ct to ŝt
(
MPCη =
R−1
1−Π
)
and precautionary savings, i.e., the intercept of the consumption
profile
(
PS = Πc1−Π
)
.28 Specifically, if we temporarily shut down the concern about disturbances
to perceived permanent income, we can see from (42) that the smaller the value of ϑ the lower
the MPC and the smaller the precautionary saving increment
∂ (MPCη)
∂ϑ
> 0 and
∂ (PS)
∂ϑ
> 0
because
∂ω2η
∂ϑ > 0,
∂ω2η
∂θ < 0,
∂ω2η
∂κ < 0, and
∂θ
∂ϑ < 0. From (42), we can see that the precautionary
savings increment in the RB-RI model is determined by the interaction of three factors: labor
income uncertainty, preferences for robustness (RB), and finite information-processing capacity
(RI). Figure 2 also illustrates how robustness (ϑ) and channel capacity (κ) affect ω2η. We now
provide some intuition about the effects of robustness (ϑ) on precautionary savings in this case.
An increase in robustness (a reduction in ϑ) will increase the Kalman gain θ, which leads to
lower ω2η and then low precautionary savings. We can see that under certain conditions a greater
reaction to the shock can either be interpreted as an increased concern for robustness in the
presence of model misspecification, or an increase in information-processing ability when agents
only have finite channel capacity.
We now discuss the concern about disturbances to perceived permanent income. Figure 3
illustrates Π as functions of ϑ for different values of κ in this case, and shows that increasing the
28Note that given the consumption function Π has the same effect on the marginal propensity to consume and
precautionary savings.
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robustness preference for the shock to the perceived state (decreasing ϑ) increases Π and thus
the effects of robustness on consumption and precautionary savings. In addition, we can also see
from the figure that the effect of RB (ϑ) on Π dominates the effect of RI (κ). The main reason
for this result is that RB has a strong direct effect on Π via the ratio Rω2η/ϑ.
3 Consumption and Wealth Dynamics
3.1 Sensitivity and Smoothness of Consumption Process
We will now discuss the effect of RI-RB on the dynamics of consumption, in particular the excess
smoothness and sensitivity puzzles noted earlier. Since the deterministic growth component
does not affect the stochastic properties of the model, for simplicity, here we assume that there
is no growth component (g = 1). Combining (42) with (44) yields an expression for individual
consumption in the RI-RB economy:
ct =
1−RΠ
1−Π ct−1 +
(R− 1) Π
1−Π c+
R− 1
1−Π
[
θζt
1− (1− θ)R · L + θ
(
ξt − θRξt−1
1− (1− θ)R · L
)]
, (45)
where L is the lag operator and we assume that (1− θ)R < 1. This expression implies that
consumption growth is a weighted average of all past permanent income and noise shocks. In
addition, it is also clear from (45) that the propagation mechanism of the model is determined
by the robust Kalman filter gain, θ (ϑ, κ). Figure 4 illustrates that consumption in the RB-RI
model reacts gradually to income shocks, with monotone adjustments to the corresponding RB
asymptote. Note that when log (ϑ) = 2, the robust Kalman gain is θ = 0.6688. This case is
illustrated by the dash-dotted line in Figure 4. Similarly, the dotted line corresponds to the case
in which log (ϑ) = 5 (θ = 0.5824). With a stronger preference for robustness, the precautionary
savings increment is larger and thus an income shock that is initially undetected would have larger
impacts on consumption during the adjustment process.29
Using (45), we can obtain the expression for the relative volatility of consumption growth
relative to income growth.30 The following proposition provides the expression of this relative
volatility.
29Estimating the process (45) on quarterly real nondurable and service consumption, logged and linearly detrended
with R = 1.01, produces a nonstationary process (the autoregressive roots are 1.3038 and −0.3027), so we do not
pursue this direction further. We note in passing that the estimate for θ is close to 0 and the estimate for Π is close
to 1. Lower values for R move these values closer to 0 and 1.
30Here we follow the consumption literature and use sd(∆ct)
sd(∆yt)
instead of sd(ct)
sd(yt)
to measure the relative volatility of
the consumption process. Note when ρ = 1 in the income process or ϑ =∞ (no RB), sd (yt) or sd (ct) are not well
defined.
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Proposition 3 The relative volatility of consumption growth relative to income growth is
µ ≡ sd (∆ct)
sd (∆yt)
=
θ
1−Π
√√√√ ∞∑
j=0
Υ2j +
ρθ
θR (1− ρθR)
∞∑
j=0
(Υj −RΥj−1)2, (46)
where we use the fact that ω2ξ = var (ξt) =
1−θ
θ(1−(1−θ)R2)ω
2
ζ , ρs =
1−RΠ
1−Π ∈ (0, 1), ρθ = (1− θ)R ∈
(0, 1), and Υj =
∑j
k=0
(
ρj−ks ρkθ
)
−∑j−1k=0 (ρj−1−ks ρkθ), for j ≥ 1, and Υ0 = 1.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
The upper panel of Figure 5 illustrates how RB (ϑ) affects the relative volatility of consumption
growth to income growth for different values of κ. It clearly shows that for any given value of ϑ,
the relative volatility µ is decreasing with κ. The intuition is that less capacity leads to higher
total induced uncertainty
(
ω2η
)
for given values of RB. Furthermore, when κ is relatively low
(e.g., 0.3 bits), the relative volatility µ is increasing with ϑ. The reason is that reducing ϑ has
opposing effects on µ (or Π) for the two types of model misspecification: µ (Π) is decreasing
(increasing) with ϑ for Type I misspecification and is increasing (decreasing) with ϑ for Type II
misspecification. Note that here the effect due to Type I misspecification is direct and the effect
due to the impact of ϑ on the robust Kalman gain θ and ω2η is indirect. When κ is relatively low,
the indirect channel dominates the direct channel because low κ amplifies the effect of ϑ on θ and
thus µ. In contrast, when κ is relatively high (e.g., 0.5 bits), the relative volatility µ is decreasing
with ϑ. The reason for this result is that in this case the direct effect dominates the indirect
effect. To explore the intuition behind this result, we consider the perfect-state-observation case
in which κ = ∞. In this case, the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth
reduces to
µ =
1
1−Π
√
2
1 + ρs
, (47)
which clearly shows that ϑ increases the relative volatility via two channels. First, a higher ϑ
increases the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income
(
R−1
1−Π
)
, and second, it
increases consumption volatility by reducing the persistence of permanent income measured by
ρs:
∂ρs
∂Π < 0.
In the presence of robustness, rational inattention measured by κ affects consumption volatility
via two channels: (i) the gradual and smooth responses to income shocks (i.e., the 1− ρθ ·L term
in (45) and (ii) the RI-induced noises (ξt). Specifically, a reduction in capacity κ decreases
the Kalman gain θ, which strengthens the smooth responses to income shock and increases the
volatility of the RI-induced noise. Luo (2008) shows that the noise effect dominates the smooth
response effect, and the volatility of consumption growth decreases with κ. The lower panel of
Figure 5 illustrates how ϑ affects the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth for
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different values of κ and there is no noise term. In this case, ∆ct =
(1−R)Π
1−Π (ct−1 − c)+ R−11−Π θζt1−ρθ·L .
The reason is that reducing ϑ increases the robust Kalman gain θ, which leads to a more volatile
consumption process because the smooth response effect completely dominates the noise effect.
When ρ 6= 1, we can also compute the relative volatility of consumption to income:
µ0 ≡ sd (ct)
sd (yt)
=
θ (R− 1)
√
1− ρ2
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
√√√√ (1 + ρsρθ)
(1− ρsρθ)
[
(1 + ρsρθ)
2 − (ρs + ρθ)2
] [1 + ρθ (1 +R2)
θR (1− ρθR)
]
,
(48)
which implies that ∂µ0∂κ < 0 and
∂µ0
∂ϑ > 0. That is, the relative volatility of consumption to income is
increasing with the degree of inattention holding ϑ fixed because RI introduces endogenous noises.
This result is the same as that for the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth.
In contrast, the relative volatility of consumption to income is increasing with the degree of RB
holding κ fixed. The main reason is that robustness reduces the autocorrelation of consumption;
for example, under FI-RE consumption is a random walk but RB makes it a stationary AR(1).
It is worth noting that from the expressions of µ or µ0, we can obtain an interesting testable
implication of our RB-RI model. Specifically, if we allow capacity to elastic as in Sims (2010),
κ and θ are increasing functions of the fundamental uncertainty
(
ω2ζ
)
.31 In this case, for given
ϑ, consumption will be smoother when income becomes more volatile because greater income
uncertainty makes consumers devote more attention to monitoring the state. On the other hand,
if we use the detection error probabilities (DEP) as the deep RB parameter as in Hansen and
Sargent (2007), ϑ will adjust in response to changes in income uncertainty to maintain the same
level of DEP.32 In this case, for given values of κ, greater income uncertainty leads to less values of
ϑ to maintain the same value of DEP. (Here we follow Hansen and Sargent 2007 and assume that
DEP is stable over time and across regions.) These theoretical results might provide a potential
explanation for the empirical evidence documented in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)
that income and consumption inequality diverged over the sampling period they study.33
3.2 Saving Process
Combining the original budget constraint, bt+1 = Rbt + yt − ct, with the consumption function
(42), we can obtain the following expression for individual saving dt:
dt ≡ bt+1 − bt = −Π (R− 1)
1−Π
(
bt − b
)
+
(
1− R− 1
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
)
(yt − y) + ςt+1, (49)
31See Luo and Young (2014) for a proof.
32See Section 5 for a detailed discussion on the DEP calibration procedure.
33They create a new panel series of consumption that combines information from PSID and CEX, focusing on
the period when some of the largest changes in income inequality occurred.
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where the evolution of individual financial wealth (bt) follows
bt+1 = ρsbt +
Π
1−Π (c− y) +
(
1− R− 1
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
)
(yt − y) + ςt+1, (50)
where ςt+1 =
R−1
1−Π (st − ŝt) is determined by the estimation error, st− ŝt = (1−θ)ζt1−(1−θ)R·L− θξt1−(1−θ)R·L
and b = c−yR−1 is the steady state value of bt. From (49), we have the following proposition for
unconditional mean of individual saving:
Proposition 4 E [dt] = 0. That is, induced uncertainty due to the interaction of RB and RI
does not affect the amount of individual saving on average.
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
Furthermore, using (49), we can compute the relative volatility of individual savings to income.
The following proposition provides the expression of this ratio.
Proposition 5 The relative volatility of individual savings is
µd ≡ sd (∆b)
sd (∆y)
=
√
(1 + ρ) (R− ρ)2
2
√√√√√ 1−ρ1+ρ + Γ21−ρ2s +
(
R−1
1−Π
)2
1−θ
1−R2(1−θ)
+2(1−ρ)Γ1−ρρs +
(
R−1
1−Π
)
2(1−ρ)(1−θ)
1−ρρθ +
(
R−1
1−Π
)
2Γ(1−θ)
1−ρsρθ
, (51)
where Γ = − (R−1)Π1−Π < 0, ρs = 1−RΠ1−Π , and Π = θ(ϑ,κ)1−(1−θ(ϑ,κ))R2Rω2ζ/ϑ.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
The complexity of this expression prevents us from obtaining clear results about how RI and
RB affect the variance of individual savings. Figure 6 illustrates the effects of RB (ϑ) on the
relative volatility for different values of κ, when ω2ζ = 1 and ρ = 0.9. We can see from the figure
that µd is increasing with channel capacity (κ) and is decreasing with robustness (ϑ). The main
reason for this result is that consumers are more information-constrained or are less concerned
about model specification, and saving is treated as a residual in the consumption-saving problem
with a given income process.34 If we now consider an aggregate economy with a continuum of ex
ante identical inattentive consumers with the same preference for robustness and each of them
has the consumption function (42), then the total saving demand in the economy is equal to zero.
The intuition is simple. The saving function can be expressed as a combination of different types
of income and noise shocks: ς, ε or ζ, and ξ, and all of these shocks are idiosyncratic. These
idiosyncratic shocks cancel out after aggregating across consumers and therefore have no effect
on aggregate savings.
34Note that from (48), we have ∂µ0
∂κ
< 0 and ∂µ0
∂ϑ
> 0.
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4 Comparison with Risk-sensitive Control and Filtering
Risk-sensitivity (RS) was first introduced into the LQ-Gaussian framework by Jacobson (1973)
and extended by Whittle (1990). Exploiting the recursive utility framework of Epstein and Zin
(1989), Hansen and Sargent (1995) introduce discounting into the RS specification and show that
the resulting decision rules are time-invariant. In the RS model agents effectively compute expec-
tations through a distorted lens, increasing their effective risk aversion by overweighting negative
outcomes. The resulting decision rules depend explicitly on the variance of the shocks, produc-
ing precautionary savings, but the value functions are still quadratic functions of the states.35
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999, henceforth, HST) and Hansen and Sargent (2007) interpret
RS preferences in terms of a concern about model uncertainty (robustness or RB) and argue that
RS introduces precautionary savings because RS consumers want to protect themselves against
model specification errors. In the corresponding risk-sensitive filtering LQ problem, the problem
is that when the state cannot be observed perfectly, is the classical Kalman filter that minimizes
the expected loss function still optimal? In our LQ-PIH model setting, we can easily see that the
regular Kalman filter is still optimal given the quadratic forms of the utility function and the value
function.36 In this section we will explore how the RS filtering affects consumption dynamics and
precautionary savings and show that the OE between RB and RS is no longer linear, but takes
a more complicated non-linear form. The RI version of risk-sensitive control based on recursive
preferences with an exponential certainty equivalence function can be formulated as
v̂ (ŝt) = max
ct
{
−1
2
(ct − c)2 + βRt [v̂ (ŝt+1)]
}
(52)
subject to the Kalman filter equation (13).37 The distorted expectation operator is now given by
Rt [v̂ (ŝt+1)] = − 1
α
logEt [exp (−αv̂ (ŝt+1))] ,
35Formally, one can view risk-sensitive agents as ones who have non-state-separable preferences, as in Epstein
and Zin (1989), but with a value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to one.
36As shown in Moore, Elliott, and Dey (1997), even if the agent has risk-sensitive preferences when filtering,
min lnEt
{
exp
[
−ϑ
(
st − ŝRSt
)2]}
,
the risk-sensitive estimate ŝRSt is identical to the minimum variance estimate ŝ obtained from solving
minEt
[
(st − ŝt)2
]
.
37Given the quadratic form of the value function, introducing risk-sensitivity does not change the optimality of
the ex post Gaussianity of the true state and the induced noise; see Luo and Young (2010) for more discussion.
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where s0| I0 ∼ N
(
ŝ0, σ
2
)
, ŝt = Et [st] is the perceived state variable, θ is the optimal weight
on the new observation of the state, and ξt+1 is the endogenous noise. The optimal choice of
the weight θ is given by θ (κ) = 1 − 1/ exp(2κ) ∈ [0, 1]. It is worth noting that given that the
value function in the RS model is quadratic, the regular Kalman filter is still optimal because the
objective function in the filtering problem is the square of the estimation error.
Following the same procedure used in Hansen and Sargent (1995) and Luo and Young (2010),
we can solve this risk-sensitive control problem explicitly. The following proposition summarizes
the solution to the RI-RS model when βR = 1:
Proposition 6 Given finite channel capacity κ and the degree of risk-sensitivity α, the consump-
tion function of a risk-sensitive consumer under RI is
ct =
R− 1
1−Π ŝt −
Πc
1−Π , (53)
where
Π = Rαω2η ∈ (0, 1) , (54)
ω2η is defined in (16), and θ (κ) = 1− 1/ exp(2κ).
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Comparing (20) obtained from the model with only concerns about the innovation to the
perceived state (i.e., without robust Kalman filtering) in Section 2.2 and (53), it is straightforward
to show that RB and RS under RI are indistinguishable using only consumption-savings decisions
if
α =
1
ϑ
. (55)
Note that (55) is exactly the same as the observational equivalence condition obtained in the
full-information RE model (see Backus, Routledge, and Zin 2004). That is, under the assumption
that the agent trusts the Kalman filter equation, the OE result obtained under full-information
RE still holds under RI.38
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) show that as far as the quantity observations on con-
sumption and savings are concerned, the robustness version (ϑ > 0 or α > 0, β˜) of the PIH model
is observationally equivalent to the standard version (ϑ = ∞ or α = 0, β = 1/R) of the PIH
model for a unique pair of discount factors.39 The intuition is that introducing a preference for
risk-sensitivity (RS) or a concern about robustness (RB) increases savings in the same way as
38The states are different, of course – st vs. ŝt.
39HST (1999) derive the observational equivalence result by fixing all parameters, including R, except for the
pair (α, β).
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increasing the discount factor, so that the discount factor can be changed to offset the effect of
a change in RS or RB on consumption and investment.40 Alternatively, holding all parameters
constant except the pair (α, β), the RI version of the PIH model with RB consumers (ϑ > 0
and βR = 1) is observationally equivalent to the standard RI version of the model (ϑ0 = ∞
and β˜ > 1/R). To do so, we compare the consumption function obtained from the RI model
(ϑ = ∞ and β˜ > 1/R), ct =
(
R− 1βR
)
ŝt − 1R−1
(
1− 1βR
)
c, with (42) and (53), and find that
when β˜ = 1R
1−Rω2η/ϑ
1−R2ω2η/ϑ =
1
R
1−Rαω2η
1−R2αω2η >
1
R , consumption and savings are identical in the RI, RB-RI,
and RS-RI models.
However, if we compare (42) obtained from the model with both concerns about the inno-
vation to the perceived state and concerns about Kalman gain with (53), it is obvious that the
observational equivalence between RB and RS under RI, (55), no longer holds. Given the same
value of κ, the Kalman gain only depends on κ in the RS model, whereas it depends on both
κ and ϑ (the preference for robust Kalman gain) in the RB model. The two Kalman gains are
therefore different for any finite value of ϑ. If we allow for different values of κ, the models are
observationally equivalent when α = ϑ−1 and
θ (ϑ, κRB) = 1− 1
exp(2κRS)
.
Figure 7 illustrates how κRS varies with ϑ and κRB when the OE between RB and RS holds under
RI. It clearly shows that given the level of ϑ, κRS is increasing with κRB.
5 Market Price of Induced Uncertainty
The PIH model presented in Section 2.2 is usually regarded as a partial equilibrium model.
However, as noted in Hansen (1987) and HST (1999), it can be interpreted as a general equilibrium
model with a linear production technology and an exogenous income process. Given the expression
of optimal consumption in terms of the state variables derived from the robust version of the
PIH model with inattentive agents, we can price assets by treating the process of aggregate
consumption that solves the model as though it were an endowment process. In this setup,
equilibrium prices are shadow prices that leave the agent content with that endowment process.
HST (1999) study how robustness and risk-sensitivity affect the predicted market price of risk
within a PIH model with shocks to both labor income and preferences, and find that RB or
RS significantly alter the model’s predictions on the market price of risk and thus provides an
alternative explanation for the equity premium puzzle.
40As shown in HST (1999), the two models have different implications for asset prices because continuation
valuations change as one varies (α, β) within the observationally-equivalent set of parameters.
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In this section, using the optimal consumption and saving decisions derived in the previous
sections, we will explore how induced uncertainty due to the interactions of RB and RI with
income shocks affect the market price of uncertainty. We first consider the single-period asset
pricing case. In this case, we assume that the agent purchases a security at period t at a price qt,
holds it for one period, and then sells it at t+1 for a total payoff φt+1 in terms of the consumption
good after collecting the dividend. Under this assumption, the following Euler equation holds:
qt = E˜t
[(
β
u′ (ŝt+1)
u′ (ŝt)
)
φt+1
]
, (56)
where β u
′(ŝt+1)
u′(ŝt) is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) and E˜t [·] is the distorted conditional
expectations operator. Note that here SDF depends on the perceived states because optimal
consumption is a linear function of perceived permanent income; because ŝt+1 is a function of
the true state st+1, st will also affect the SDF. The corresponding formula for qt in terms of the
original conditional expectations operator can be written as
qt = Et [mt,t+1φt+1] , (57)
where mt,t+1 depends not only on the usual SDF but also on robustness. As has been shown
in Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), RB or RS are reflected in the usual measure of the
SDF being scaled by a random variable with conditional mean 1. They also show that this
multiplicative adjustment to the SDF increases the volatility of the SDF and thus drives up the
risk premium. To explore the effects of induced uncertainty on the market price of uncertainty,
we write (57) as
qt = Et [φt+1]Et [mt,t+1] + cov t (mt,t+1, φt+1) ,
which leads to the following price bound:
qt ≥ Et [φt+1]Et [mt,t+1]− sd t (mt,t+1) sd t (φt+1) ,
where sd t (·) denotes the conditional standard deviation. If we define the market price of un-
certainty (MPU) as MPU ≡ sd t(mt,t+1)Et[mt,t+1] , the Hansen-Jagannathan (HJ) bound can be rewritten
as
MPU ≥ Et [φt+1/qt]
sd t (φt+1/qt)
,
where the RHS is the Sharpe ratio and is above 0.2 for most industrial countries.41 In the
standard full-information state- and time-separable utility model, the value of MPU is an order
41In the U.S. data presented in Campbell (2002), the Sharpe ratio is about 0.52 (annualized) during 1947− 1998.
Using a longer annual U.S. time series put together by Shiller yields a similar value of the Sharpe ratio.
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of magnitude lower than what is required for this inequality to be satisfied, which is just another
manifestation of the equity premium puzzle: consumption growth is smooth, uncorrelated with
returns, and has near zero autocorrelation, leading to a small cost of bearing uncertainty.42
5.1 MPU under RB and RI
The SDF, mt,t+1, can be decomposed into
mt,t+1 = m
f
t,t+1m
rb
t,t+1,
where mft,t+1 ≡ β u
′(ŝt+1)
u′(ŝt) is the “familiar” stochastic discount factor (ϑ = ∞) and mrbt,t+1 is
the Radon-Nikodym derivative, or the likelihood ratio of the distorted conditional probability
of ŝt+1 with respect to the approximating conditional probability. Under the two-player game
specification of RB, (19), asset prices are computed using the pessimistic view of the next period’s
shock: η˜t+1 = ωη ˜t+1 = ωη (t+1 + wt), where ˜t+1 is a normally distributed variable with mean
ωηwt and variance ω
2
η. In this case, the Radon-Nikodym derivative can be written as
mrbt,t+1 ≡
exp
(
− (˜t+1 − wt)2 /2
)
exp
(−˜2t+1/2) = exp (˜t+1wt − w2t /2) .
By construction, we obtain Et
[
mrbt,t+1
]
= 1. By straightforward calculations, we obtain the
following conditional second moment of mrbt,t+1 as a means for computing its conditional variance:
Et
[(
mrbt,t+1
)2]
= exp
(
w2t
)
. (58)
The following proposition summarizes the result on how induced uncertainty affects the market
price of uncertainty.
Proposition 7 The expression for the market price of induced uncertainty is
sd t
(
mrbt,t+1
)
=
√
exp
(
w2t
)− 1 ∼= |wt| (59)
for small distortions, where wt is the mean of the worse-case shock:
wt = Θ [(R− 1) ŝt − c] (60)
and Θ =
Π/ωη
1−Π .
42The standard deviation of aggregate consumption growth is 0.84 percent, the correlation with real returns on
the S&P500 Index is 0.22, and the autocorrelation is 0.08, using nondurables and services deflated by the PCE
deflator.
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Proof. Given Et
[
mrbt,t+1
]
= 1, we can obtain (59) using (58). It is also straightfoward to derive
(60) using (21).
Expression (59) clearly shows that the amount of market price of uncertainty contributed by
the Radon-Nikodym derivative is approximately equal to the norm of the mean of the worse-case
shock (w).43 Note that Θ can be used to measure the importance of RB and RI in determining
the market price of uncertainty for given ŝt and ∂Θ/∂Π > 0. Specifically, both ϑ and κ influence
mrbt,t+1 through their effects on Π.
44 Lowering ϑ strengthens the preference for robustness and
then drive mrbt,t+1 away from 1 by increasing Π. Lowering κ reduces the Kalman gain, and then
increases ωη and Π. However, since the evolution of ŝt is also affected by ωη and Π, we have to
take both the Θ term and the (R− 1) ŝt − c term in (60) into account when evaluating how the
interaction of RB and RI affects the market price of uncertainty.
To fully explore how induced uncertainty due to RB and RI affects the market price of uncer-
tainty, we adopt the calibration procedure outlined in HSW (2002), AHS (2003), and Hansen and
Sargent (Chapter 9, 2007) to calibrate the value of Π that summarizes the interaction between
RB and RI. Specifically, we calibrate Π by using the notion of a model detection error probability
that is based on a statistical theory of model selection. We can then infer what values of the
RB parameter imply reasonable fears of model misspecification for empirically-plausible approxi-
mating models. The model detection error probability denoted by p is a measure of how far the
distorted model can deviate from the approximating model without being discarded; low values
for this probability mean that agents are unwilling to discard very many models, implying that
the cloud of models surrounding the approximating model is large (since agents want errors to
be rare, they push the two models very far apart). The value of p is determined by the following
procedure. Let model A denote the approximating model, (13), and model B be the distorted
model, (17). Define pA as
pA = Prob
(
ln
(
LA
LB
)
< 0
∣∣∣∣A) , (61)
where ln
(
LA
LB
)
is the log-likelihood ratio. When model A generates the data, pA measures the
probability that a likelihood ratio test selects model B. In this case, we call pA the probability of
the model detection error. Similarly, when model B generates the data, we can define pB as
pB = Prob
(
log
(
LA
LB
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣B) . (62)
43In other words, |wt| is an upper bound on the approximate enhancement to the market price of uncertainty
caused by the interaction of RB and RI.
44When κ =∞, i.e., no RI, (60) reduces to wt = Π/ωη1−Π [(R− 1) st − c]. Without RB, wt = 0.
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The detection error probability, p, is defined as the average of pA and pB:
p (ϑ; Π) =
1
2
(pA + pB) , (63)
where ϑ is the robustness parameter used to generate model B. Given this definition, we can see
that 1−p measures the probability that econometricians can distinguish the approximating model
from the distorted model. Now we show how to compute the model detection error probability
in the RB model. The general idea of the calibration exercise is to find a value of (or Π) such
that p (ϑ0; Π) equals a given value (for example, 5 percent or 10 percent) after simulating model
A, (13), and model B, (17).45
Following the consumption and saving literature, we set R = 1.02, ω/y0 = 0.15, ρ = 0.8,
and c = 3.5y0. Using these parameter values, Figures 8 shows how p affects the mean of MPU
under RB and RI.46 Using either the data set documented in Campbell (2002) or that provided
by Shiller, the estimated Sharpe ratio for the postwar U.S. time series is greater than 50 percent
a year. Figure 9 plots the Hansen-Jagannathan (HJ) bound under RB and RI when θ = 0.1 using
the Shiller data set. It is clear from this figure that the model’s predicted MPU can enter the
HJ bound when both the preference for RB and the degree of RI are strong, i.e., when p = 0.05
or p = 0.1 and θ = 0.1. If we consider the international developed-country data set in Campbell
(2002), the Sharpe ratio is between 15 percent and 20 percent for Australia and Italy, between 20
percent and 30 percent for Canada and Japan, and above 30 percent for all the other countries.
In the long-run annual data sets the lower bound on the standard deviation exceeds 30% for all
three countries. From Figure 9, we can see that the theoretical MPU satisfies the HJ bound for
higher values of p. Figure 10 clearly shows that our results about how the interaction of RB and
RI with income uncertainty affects the market price of uncertainty are robust to the changes in
the values of R, ω/y0, ρ, and c.
Since θ is a critical parameter, we show explicitly in Figure 11 how the predictions for each
value of p vary with θ. It is clear that a low value of θ is important for satisfying the HJ bounds;
as we reduce θ we reduce the required level of p, so that the worst-case model can move closer to
the approximating model (that is, we can reduce the required fear of model misspecification).
45The number of periods used in the simulation, T , is set to be the actual length of the data we study. For
example, if we consider the post-war U.S. annual time series data provided by Shiller from 1946− 2010, T = 65.
46Because the effects of RB and RI on the mean and median of MPU are quite similar, we focus on the mean of
MPU in our subsequent analysis.
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5.2 MPU under RS and RI
Under the risk-sensitivity specification of RB, (24), we can also compute the corresponding market
price of uncertainty. The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between t and t+ 1 can be
written as
mt,t+1 = m
f
t,t+1m
rs
t,t+1,
where mft,t+1 ≡ β u
′(ŝt+1)
u′(ŝt) and m
rs
t,t+1 ≡ exp(−vt+1/ϑ)Et[exp(−vt+1/ϑ)] =
exp(−(Ωŝ2t+1+ρ)/ϑ)
exp(−(Ω̂ŝ2t+ρ̂)/ϑ)
. Using a formula found
in Jacobson (1973) and used in HST (1999), we have Et
[(
mrst,t+1
)2]
= exp
(
−2
[(
Ω˜− Ω̂
)
ŝ2t + (ρ˜− ρ̂)
]
/ϑ
)
,
because Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ)] = exp(−2(Ω˜ŝ2t + ρ˜) /ϑ). The following proposition sum-
marizes the result on how induced uncertainty affects the amount of market price of uncertainty
under the RS specification of RB.
Proposition 8 Under RS-RI, the Radon-Nikodym derivative is
Et
[(
mrst,t+1
)2]
= exp
(
Ξrs [(R− 1) ŝt − c]2
)
Υ, (64)
where Ξrs ≡ RΠ(1−RΠ)
ϑ0(1−Π)2[1−(2R−1)Π] and Υ ≡
1−(R−1)Π/(1−Π)√
1−2(R−1)Π/(1−Π) . The market price of induced uncer-
tainty is
sd t
(
mrst,t+1
)
=
√
exp
(
Ξrs ((R− 1) ŝt − c)2
)
Υ− 1 ∼= |
√
Ξrs ((R− 1) ŝt − c) | (65)
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
Denote Ξrb = Θ2, we have
∆ ≡
√
Ξrs
Ξrb
=
√
1−RΠ
1− (2R− 1) Π , (66)
which is close 1 when R is close 1 and Π is not too large. Using (66), it is straightforward to
show that ∂∆∂Π > 0 and
∂∆
∂θ < 0, i.e., the stronger the degree of RI, the larger the difference of
the market price of uncertainty under the RB and RS specifications. Figure 12 illustrates how
∆ varies with Π for given values of R. It is clear that theoretically the difference of the market
price of uncertainty between RB and RS under RI can be very significant. For example, when
R = 1.02, ∆ = 1.25 when Π = 0.93. In other words, the MPU under the RS-RI specification is 25
percent higher than that under the RB-RI specification when the two models are observationally
equivalent. However, after calibrating empirically-plausible ϑ (and Π) using the DEP, sdt
(
mrbt,t+1
)
and sdt
(
mrst,t+1
)
are very close because R is close to 1 and the calibrated values of Π are between
0.1 and 0.2 for p = 0.05.47 Figure 13 clearly shows that the two specifications have similar effects
47The calibrated values of Π are lower for higher values of p.
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on the mean of for MPU different values of p and θ. In addition, Figure 14 plots the HJ bound
under RS and RI when θ = 0.1 using the same data set as in the above RB-RI specification, and
it is clear that this HJ bound is similar to that shown in Figure 9.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided a characterization of the consumption-savings behavior of agents who
have a preference for robustness (worries about model misspecification) and limited information-
processing ability. After obtaining the optimal individual decisions, we explore how two types
of induced uncertainty, state uncertainty due to RI and model uncertainty due to RB, affect
consumption and saving decisions as well as the market prices of uncertainty. Specifically, we show
that concerns about different types of model misspecification – (i) disturbances to the perceived
permanent income and (ii) the Kalman gain – can have opposite effects on consumption, savings,
and asset prices via interacting with finite capacity in the control and filtering problems. In
addition, we show that once allowing RB consumers to use the robust Kalman filter to update the
perceived state, the simple observational equivalence (OE) between RB and RS obtained in HST
(1999) no longer holds; instead, we find a more complicated OE between RB and RS. Finally,
we explore how the two types of informational frictions affect the market price of risk in general
equilibrium.
7 Appendix (For Online Publication)
7.1 Solving the Two-Player Game Version of the Robust Model
To solve the Bellman equation (19) subject to (17), ŝt+1 = Rŝt − ct + ωηwt + ηt+1, we conjecture
that
v (ŝt) = −C −Bŝt −Aŝ2t , (67)
where A, B, and C are constants to be determined. Substituting this guessed value function into
the Bellman equation (19) gives
−C −Bŝt −Aŝ2t = maxct minwt
{
−1
2
(ct − c)2 + βEt
[
ϑ˜0w
2
t − C −Bŝt+1 −Aŝ2t+1
]}
, (68)
where ϑ˜0 = ϑ0/2. We can do the min and max operations in any order, so we choose to do the
minimization first. The first-order condition for wt is
2ϑνt − 2AEt (ωηwt +Rŝt − ct)ωη −Bωη = 0,
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which means that
wt =
B + 2A (Rŝt − ct)
2
(
ϑ˜0 −Aω2η
) ωη. (69)
Substituting (69) back into (68) gives
−Aŝ2t−Bŝt−C = maxct
−12 (c− ct)2 + βEt
ϑ˜0 [B + 2A (Rst − ct)
2
(
ϑ−Aω2η
) ωη]2 −As2t+1 −Bst+1 − C
 ,
where ŝt+1 = Rŝt − ct + ωηwt + ηt+1. The first-order condition for ct is
(c− ct)−2βϑ˜0 Aωη
ϑ−Aω2η
wt+ 2βA
(
1 +
Aω2η
ϑ˜0 −Aω2η
)
(Rŝt − ct + ωηwt) +βB
(
1 +
Aω2η
ϑ˜0 −Aω2η
)
= 0.
Using the solution for νt the solution for consumption is
ct =
2AβR
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt +
c
(
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0
)
+ βB
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
.
Substituting the above expressions into the Bellman equation gives
−Aŝ2t −Bŝt − C
= −1
2
(
2AβR
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt +
−2βAc+ βB
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
)2
+
βϑ˜0ω
2
η(
2
(
ϑ˜0 −Aω2η
))2
2AR
(
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0
)
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt +B −
2c
(
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0
)
A+ 2βAB
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
2
− βA

 R
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt −
−Bω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2c+ 2Bβ
2
(
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
)
2 + ω2η

− βB
 R
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt −
−Bω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2c+ 2Bβ
2
(
1−Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
)
− βC.
Collecting and matching terms, the constant coefficients turn out to be
A =
βR2 − 1
2β − ω2η/ϑ˜0
, B =
(
βR2 − 1) c
(R− 1)
(
ω2η/
(
ϑ˜0
)
− β
) , C = R (βR2 − 1)
2
(
βR−Rω2η/ϑ˜0
)
(R− 1)2
(
(R− 1)ω2η + c2
)
,
where ϑ˜0 = ϑ0/2. When βR = 1, we obtain the consumption function (20) in the text.
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7.2 Computing the Market Price of Uncertainty
Given the value function we obtained in Section (2.2),
v (ŝt) = Ω
(
ŝt − c
R− 1
)2
+ ρ, (70)
where Ω = −R(R−1)2(1−Π) and ρ = ϑ02(R−1) ln
(
1− (R−1)Π1−Π
)
, it follows from Jacobson (1973) and HST
(1999) that the risk-sensitivity operator can be written as
Rt [v̂ (ŝt+1)] = −ϑ0 logEt [exp (−v̂ (ŝt+1) /ϑ0)] = Ω̂
(
ŝt − c
R− 1
)2
+ ρ̂,
where
Ω̂ = ρ2sΩ
(
1− 2
ϑ0
Ωω2η
(
1 +
2
ϑ0
Ωω2η
)−1)
= −R (R− 1) (1−RΠ)
2 (1−Π)2
and
ρ̂ = ρ+
ϑ0
2
ln
(
1 +
2
ϑ0
Ωω2η
)
=
ϑ0
2 (R− 1) ln
(
1− 2 (R− 1) Π
1−Π
)
+
ϑ0
2
ln
(
1− (R− 1) Π
(1−Π)
)
,
where we assume that 2(R−1)Π1−Π < 1.
Given that
mrst,t+1 ≡
exp (−vt+1/ϑ0)
Et [exp (−vt+1/ϑ0)] =
exp
(− (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)
exp
(
−
(
Ω̂ŝ2t + ρ̂
)
/ϑ0
) ,
we have (
mrst,t+1
)2
=
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)
exp
(
−2
(
Ω̂ŝ2t + ρ̂
)
/ϑ0
) .
Multiplying the numerator and denominator by the time t conditional mean of the exponential
term in the numerator, Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)], gives(
mrst,t+1
)2
=
Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)]
exp
(
−2
(
Ω̂ŝ2t + ρ̂
)
/ϑ0
) exp (−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)
Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)] ,
where the exponential term, Et
[
exp
(
σ
(
Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ
))]
, can be computed using a formula found in
Jacobson (1973):
Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)] = exp(−2(Ω˜ŝ2t + ρ˜) /ϑ0) ,
where Ω˜ = ρ2sΩ
(
1− 4ϑ0 Ωω2η
(
1 + 4ϑ0 Ωω
2
η
)−1)
= Rρ
2
sΩ
R+4ΩΠ and ρ˜ = ρ +
ϑ0
4 ln
(
1 + 1ϑ0 Ωω
2
η
)
= ρ +
ϑ0
4 ln
(
1− 2(R−1)Π(1−Π)
)
. Therefore, we obtain
Et
[(
mrst,t+1
)2]
= exp
(
−2
((
Ω˜− Ω̂
)
ŝ2t + (ρ˜− ρ̂)
)
/ϑ0
)
,
which yields (64) in the main text.
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Figure 1: MRT between RB and RI
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Figure 2: Effects of RB and RI on Robust Kalman Gain θ and ω2η
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Figure 3: Effects of RB and RI on Π
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Consumption to Income Shock
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Figure 5: Relative Volatility of Consumption to Income under RB-RI
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Figure 6: Relative Volatility of Individual Saving
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Figure 7: The OE between RB and RS
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Figure 8: Effects of p on the mean of MPU for Different θ
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Figure 9: HJ Bound under RB and RI
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Figure 10: Sensitivity Analysis of the Effects of RB on MPU (θ = 0.3)
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Figure 11: Sensitivity Analysis of the Effects of RB and RI on MPU
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Figure 12: Difference of MPU under RB+RI and RS+RI
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Figure 13: Comparison of the Effects of p on MPU under RB+RI and RS+RI
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Figure 14: HJ Bound under RS and RI
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